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ABSTRACT
An independent central bank can manage its balance sheet and its capital so as to commit itself to
a depreciation of its currency and an exchange-rate peg. This way, the central bank can implement
the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, which involves a commitment to higher future inflation.
This commitment mechanism works even though, realistically, the central bank cannot commit itself
to a particular future money supply. It supports the feasibility of Svensson’s Foolproof Way to










In a liquidity trap, the nominal interest rate is zero, but the real interest rate is higher than
optimal, due to private-sector expectations of low in￿ ation or even de￿ ation. It is well known since
Krugman [12], that the optimal way to escape from a liquidity trap is to generate expectations of
a higher future price level and thereby expectations of higher future in￿ ation. This will lower the
real interest rate and stimulate the economy out of the liquidity trap, even though the nominal
interest rate is zero. The problem, also emphasized by Krugman [12], is how to make the higher
future price level credible. A promise of a higher future price level may not be credible, since the
central bank may renege on its promise in the future and achieve a lower price level than promised,
so as to maintain low and stable in￿ ation.
This paper shows that a central bank￿ s realistic concerns about its balance sheet and capital
creates a commitment mechanism, which allows the bank to commit to a higher future price level
through a current currency depreciation and a commitment to maintaining a weaker currency in
the future. This commitment mechanism provides support for the Foolproof Way to escape from
a liquidity trap that has been suggested by Svensson [19] and [20].1 The bank wishes to maintain
its independence from the government. A negative capital would require a capital injection from
the government and put the bank at the government￿ s mercy. In order to avoid this, the bank
never voluntarily allows its capital to fall below a certain minimum level. Because undoing the
current currency depreciation by a future currency appreciation would imply a future capital loss
on the bank￿ s foreign-exchange reserves, a minimum capital level provides a lower bound on the
future exchange rate (an upper bound on the future currency appreciation). By managing its
capital such that the minimum capital level is reached for the exchange-rate level consistent with
the desired higher future price level, the bank can commit itself to that higher future price level.
Although we believe that foreign-exchange reserves provide the most relevant and realistic case, this
commitment mechanism could potentially also arise for other assets on central-bank balance sheets,
such as equity, property and indexed bonds￿ but not, as we shall see, for ￿xed-income securities
nominated in the home currency.
Although several recent papers on liquidity traps and the experience of Japan have emphasized
the credibility problem of committing to future in￿ ation for a central bank with an established
1 The Foolproof Way consists of announcing and implementing (1) a target path for the domestic price-level,
starting above the current price level by the ￿price gap￿ that the central bank wishes to undo, (2) a currency
depreciation and a crawling peg to achieve the price-level target path, and (3) an exit strategy in the form of
abandoning the peg and shifting to ￿ exible in￿ ation or price-level targeting once the price-level target path has been
reached.
1low-in￿ ation reputation (for instance, Krugman [12], Svensson [19]-[21], and Eggertsson [5]), this
literature has not explicitly incorporated the speci￿c balance-sheet concerns of independent central
banks.
Eggertsson [5] models the role of the nominal liabilities of a combined government and central
bank in providing incentives to future in￿ ation that will reduce the real value of the public debt and,
thereby, distortionary taxation. In a liquidity trap, accumulation of more nominal debt strengthens
incentives to in￿ ation in the future and increases current private-sector in￿ ation expectations. One
way to increase the nominal debt is by borrowing in order to accumulate foreign exchange. In
Eggertsson￿ s setup, and counter to the situation in many countries, including Japan, the central
bank is not independent but controlled by the government.
Our setup di⁄ers from Eggertsson￿ s in several respects. More realistically, the central bank is
not subordinated to the ￿scal authority, and monetary policy is not used to reduce the public debt
and lower future taxation. Instead the central bank is independent and concerned about its capital
solely in order to maintain its independence. It is not concerned about the balance sheet of the
consolidated public sector but about capital losses on its foreign-exchange reserves. Furthermore,
it is indi⁄erent to such capital losses as long as they do not lead to capital below the minimum
level.
For both Krugman [12] and Eggertsson [5], central-bank independence and a lack of coordination
of monetary and ￿scal policy imply a problem and a barrier to the escape from a liquidity trap. In
our paper, central-bank independence, together with balance-sheet concerns, provide the solution
to this problem.
The balance-sheet concerns of central bankers is an area of research that has been left largely
unexplored in the literature on monetary policy. However, as we show in section 4, there is a
great deal of evidence that central bankers pay attention to the capital of the central bank because
its level matters for the ￿nancial autonomy and the independence of the central bank. As more
and more central banks become independent, it would seem important to understand better the
channels by which the balance-sheet concerns of central bankers and monetary policy in￿ uence each
other. As this paper illustrates, the balance-sheet concerns of central banks may have implications
for the conduct of monetary policy that are non-trivial from an analytical point of view and relevant
for real-world policy problems.
In the context of a liquidity trap, the balance-sheet concerns of central banks have been the
subject of some informal discussion. Many commentators, for instance, Bernanke [3], have suggested
2that balance-sheet concerns of the Bank of Japan have been a barrier to more aggressive policies
and that monetary and ￿scal cooperation, including compensation for central-bank losses from
risky open-market purchases, would contribute to Japan￿ s escape from the liquidity trap.
In other contexts than a liquidity trap, more formal models of the balance-sheet concerns of
central banks have been presented. Isard [11] presents a model of currency crises in which the
central bank cares about the value of its foreign-exchange reserves. Sims [16] shows that a low
level of capital may prevent a central bank from avoiding self-ful￿lling hyperin￿ ationary equilibria.
In Sims￿ s model, balance-sheet concerns are an impediment: they prevent the central banker from
taking the right policy actions in a situation of economic distress. Sims argues that such situations
will require a closer monetary and ￿scal cooperation (a stronger ￿￿scal backing￿ of monetary
policy), which the independence of the central bank is likely to make more di¢ cult.2
Thus, according to the previous literature, balance-sheet concerns and central-bank indepen-
dence may cause problems. In contrast, in this paper, we show that, in the context of a liquidity
trap, balance-sheet concerns and central-bank independence may provide a solution, a commitment
mechanism for optimal escape from a liquidity trap.
Section 2 lays out the model of the paper, shows how a liquidity trap can arise, and speci￿es the
suboptimal policy under discretion and the optimal policy under commitment. Section 3 presents
some evidence on the balance-sheet concerns of central banks. Section 4 shows how an independent
central bank can commit itself to the optimal policy. Section 5 discusses some generalizations of
our results. Section 6 provides some conclusions. An appendix includes some technical details.
2. A simple open economy model of the liquidity trap
We consider a small open economy, a simpli￿ed version of many current open-economy models, for
instance, that in Svensson [21]. Households consume a traded good and a nontraded good. The
nontraded good is produced with nontraded intermediate inputs whose nominal prices are set one
period ahead by monopolistic producers. The central bank conducts ￿ exible in￿ ation targeting by
minimizing a standard quadratic loss function of in￿ ation and the output gap. We show that the
economy may fall into a liquidity trap with excessively low output and in￿ ation as a result of an
2 Zhu [22] presents a model with central-bank balance-sheet concerns in the context of a liquidity trap. The
balance-sheet concerns, in the form of an instrument rule with the instrument rate responding to both in￿ ation and
the central-bank￿ s real capital, lead to indeterminacy of equilibrium and increase the risk of falling into a liquidity
trap. He suggests automatic ￿scal backing of monetary policy in order to avoid the indeterminacy.
3unanticipated fall in expected productivity growth and a related fall in the natural interest rate.3
2.1. The structure of the economy
Time is separated into discrete periods, t = :::;￿1;0;1;::: There is one traded good, the foreign
good. The foreign-currency price of the good is unity in all periods. Let St denote the exchange
rate in period t, measured in home-currency units per foreign currency. The Law of One Price
holds, so the home-currency price of the foreign good is simply equal to the exchange rate. A
foreign-currency bond, with a constant continuously compounded interest rate, r￿ > 0, is the only
traded asset.
The home country has a private sector, consisting of a household and ￿rms, and a public sector,
consisting of a central bank and a government. The household consumes the traded foreign good









where Et denotes expectations conditional on information available in period t, ￿ ￿ e￿r￿
is the
discount factor, Cht denotes consumption of the home good in period t, Cft denotes consumption
of the foreign good, ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the consumption share of the foreign good, Mt denotes
the household￿ s holding of home currency, Pht denotes the home-currency price of home goods,
and Nt denotes the supply of labor. The function U(Mt=Pht) represents the liquidity services of
real money, which consist of time saved in the transactions of the home good. Real money is
consequently measured in terms of the home good.
The liquidity-services function is continuous and continuously di⁄erentiable for Mt=Pht > 0 and




) < U0; U0(
Mt
Pht
) > 0; U00(
Mt
Pht


















where e￿ > 0 is the satiation level of real money. That is, U(Mt=Pht) is increasing at a decreasing
rate for Mt=Pht < e￿ and has a maximum equal to U0 for Mt=Pht ￿ e￿. There is a positive demand
3 For simplicity, the liquidity trap is assumed to last one period, the same as the horizon of the nominal stickiness.
So although the model is in in￿nite time, the analysis of the liquidity trap will involve two periods.














for real balances regardless of how high the home-currency interest rate is. The liquidity-services
function is illustrated in ￿gure 2.1.




where we use the fact that the home-currency price of the foreign good is equal to the nominal
exchange rate.
The nontraded home good is produced in two stages. In the ￿nal stage, ￿nal-good ￿rms produce
the output Yt of the home good with inputs of a continuum of nontraded intermediate goods, Yt(￿);







where ￿ > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate inputs. The ￿nal-good
￿rms operate under perfect competition and take the prices of the home good and intermediate







where Pht(￿) denotes the home-currency price of intermediate good ￿. It follows that demand for







5In the initial stage, each intermediate good ￿ is produced by a single ￿rm ￿ with a technology
that is linear in labor input with a country-wide exogenous stochastic productivity, At,
Yt(￿) = AtNt(￿);
where Nt(￿) denotes labor input in the production of intermediate good ￿. There is hence a con-
tinuum of ￿rms producing intermediate goods. Firm ￿ maximizes pro￿ts, subject to perfect com-
petition in the labor market and monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods market (with
the gross markup ￿=(￿ ￿1) over marginal cost), and distributes the pro￿ts to the home household.
Firm ￿ sets its price for period t one period in advance, that is, in period t ￿ 1, so as to maximize





The budget constraint in period t for the home household is
PhtCht + StCft + Mt + Bt + StB￿
t = PhtYt + Mt￿1 + eit￿1Bt￿1 + Ster￿
B￿
t￿1 + Zt; (2.5)
where Bt denotes the number of home-currency one-period bonds held between periods t and t+1,
it is the continuously compounded interest rate paid in period t+1 on those bonds, B￿
t ? 0 denotes
the number of foreign-currency one-period bonds held between period t and period t+1 (positive if
the household is a lender, negative if it is a borrower), and Zt ? 0 denotes the home-currency value
of net transfers from the government. We use that the sum of total pro￿ts and wages received by
the household will equal PhtYt.
The budget constraint for the central bank is
Zt + StRt = Mt ￿ Mt￿1 + Ster￿
Rt￿1; (2.6)
where Zt is the home-currency value of the central bank￿ s dividend paid to the government, Rt ￿ 0
denotes the number of foreign-currency bonds held as foreign-exchange reserves between period
t and t + 1, and Mt ￿ Mt￿1 is the change in the central bank￿ s supply of home currency. In
this simple model, the supply of home currency, the monetary base, and the stock of money are
identical. For simplicity, we also assume that the only asset on the central bank￿ s balance sheet is
foreign-exchange reserves. As shown in appendix D, introducing domestic credit on the asset side
of the central bank￿ s balance sheet does not change our results.
6There is no government consumption. The government collects the dividend from the central
bank and passes it on as a lumpsum transfer to the household. We assume that no home-currency
bonds are held in the foreign country, and that the net supply of home-currency bonds is zero,
Bt = 0: (2.7)
2.2. Equilibrium relationships
In equilibrium, consumption and production of the home good are equal,
Cht = Yt: (2.8)
Adding (2.5) and (2.6) and using (2.7) and (2.8), we can write the consolidated budget constraint
for the home country in terms of the foreign good,





denotes the home-country￿ s net foreign assets.






(see appendix A for a derivation of the ￿rst-order conditions). Since ￿ = e￿r￿
, we realize from (2.9)
and (2.10) that Cft and Ft will be constant over time and ful￿ll
Cft = (er￿
￿ 1)Ft￿1 ￿ ￿ Cf; (2.11)
Ft = Ft￿1:
The current account is hence constant and una⁄ected by monetary policy. This property￿ which
considerably simpli￿es the analysis￿ stems from the assumptions that utility is separable in con-
sumption of home and foreign goods.








where Wt is the nominal wage in period t. The price is simply set equal to the gross markup times
the expected home-currency marginal cost.
7The ￿rst-order condition for the household￿ s labor supply implies that the wage in home goods,



















(1 ￿ ￿)At (2.15)
is the ￿ exprice level of output, the level that would prevail under ￿ exible prices and constant money
supply.4 Potential output is proportional to productivity.
Equation (2.14) shows how the decision of an individual price-setter ￿ depends on the prices
set by the competitors as well as the expected ratio of actual to potential output. It says that an
intermediate-good ￿rm sets its price above (below) its competitors￿if and only if it expects the ratio
of actual output to potential output to be above (below) one. Since in equilibrium all intermediate-
good producers set their prices at the same level, the expected ratio of actual to potential output





Actual output can deviate from potential output in the short run because of nominal stickiness.
Given that the consumption of the traded good is constant, a change in the production (and
consumption) of the nontraded good must be associated with a change in the real exchange rate.
















where we have used (2.8) and (2.11). The real exchange rate is proportional to output. We de￿ne
the natural real exchange rate as the ￿ exprice level, the level that would prevail under ￿ exible
4 One can show that the assumption of constant money supply is su¢ cient to ensure that no liquidity trap arises
under ￿ exible prices. An endogenous future money supply adjusted to maintaining low in￿ ation may prevent an
equilibrium and equality between output and potential output also under ￿ exible prices; see footnote 14.







We conclude this section with the equilibrium relationships for interest rates and money. The





where we use (2.8) and that the marginal utility of nominal income is proportional to 1=(PhtYt).










where we have used (2.1), (2.17), and (2.18). The natural (CPI) interest rate, ￿ rt, is de￿ned as the
￿ exprice real (CPI) interest rate. By (2.21), it will ful￿ll





The home-currency interest rate ful￿lls the zero lower bound,
it ￿ 0: (2.23)
Given the assumptions about the liquidity-services function, money demand can be written
Mt
Pht = G(Yt;it) (it > 0);
Mt
Pht ￿ e￿ (it = 0)
(2.24)
(see appendix A). Note that the satiation level, e￿, is independent of home output. The function







< 0 for it > 0;
G(Yt;0) = e￿:
2.3. Productivity
The dynamics of the economy is driven by the exogenous stochastic process for productivity. We
specify this process in such a way that the economy may fall in a liquidity trap in period 1 and in
that period only. This simpli￿es the analysis without substantial restriction of generality, since the
9policies that succeed in extracting the economy from a liquidity trap in period 1 can be implemented
in other periods, too.
We assume that productivity is equal to a constant level A up to period 1, and falls to a constant
lower level e￿bA from period 2 onwards (b ￿ 0). Denoting the log of variables by lower case, this
assumption can be written
at = a (t ￿ 1);
at = a ￿ b (t ￿ 2):
The value of parameter b is announced in period 1, one period before the productivity fall takes
place. It could be equal to zero, in which case productivity remains unchanged. As we shall see,
the economy falls in a liquidity trap when the value of b is large enough. The realization of b is
governed by a probability distribution function that is known by all agents, and expectations are
rational.
It then follows from (2.15) and (2.18) that the log of potential output and the log of the natural
real exchange rate also fall by b in period 2
￿ yt = ￿ y and ￿ qt = ￿ q (t ￿ 1);
￿ yt = ￿ y ￿ b and ￿ qt = ￿ q ￿ b (t ￿ 2);
(2.25)
with ￿ y and ￿ q de￿ned by







￿ q ￿ ln
￿
1 ￿ ￿
+ ￿ y ￿ ￿ cf:
Taking the log of (2.22)￿ and using that potential output is known one period in advance￿ we
get
￿ rt = r￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ yt+1 ￿ ￿ yt) = r￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)(at+1 ￿ at): (2.26)
Thus, the natural interest rate is directly related to the rate of time preference, ￿ln￿ = r￿, and to
expected productivity growth, at+1￿at. Expected productivity growth is constant and equal to zero
in all periods, except in period 1 when it is falls to ￿b. Consequently, the natural interest rate is
equal to r￿ in all periods, except in period 1 when it falls to
￿ r1 = r￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)b: (2.27)
Furthermore, the logs of money, prices, and output will be related by
mt ￿ pht = g(yt;it) (it > 0);
mt ￿ pht ￿ ￿ (it = 0);
(2.28)
10where g(yt;it) ￿ lnG(eyt;it).
As shown in appendix C, the model can be solved under rational expectations for an arbitrary
distribution of b. For expositional simplicity, however, we assume in the main text that economic
agents view the lower expected productivity growth in period 1 as very unlikely ex ante. Hence,
until period 0 they behave as if b were going to be equal to zero, and the lower expected productivity
growth comes to them as an unexpected surprise in period 1. Examining this simple case makes
the algebra easier and, as shown in the appendix, it does not a⁄ect the essence of our results on
the optimal policy to escape a liquidity trap.
2.4. Monetary policy
Assume that the central bank has an objective function corresponding to ￿￿ exible (CPI) in￿ ation




(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿Lt+￿ (2.29)




[(￿t ￿ ￿)2 + ￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt)2]; (2.30)
where ￿t = log(Pt=Pt￿1) is the in￿ ation rate, ￿ ￿ 0 is a given in￿ ation target, yt ￿ ￿ yt is the output
gap, and ￿ > 0 is a given weight on output-gap stabilization. We assume that the central bank
cannot commit to future policy actions and, hence, that it in each period t minimizes the period
loss function (2.30) under discretion, for given private-sector expectations of future in￿ ation.5
Let us derive the equilibrium in￿ ation rate. Taking the log of (2.1) and (2.17), in￿ ation can be
written
￿t ￿ pt ￿ pt￿1 = pht + ￿qt ￿ pt￿1: (2.31)
Taking the log di⁄erence of (2.18) and (2.19), we ￿nd that the log deviations of output and of the
real exchange rate from their natural levels are equal,
qt ￿ ￿ qt = yt ￿ ￿ yt: (2.32)
Using this equation to substitute for qt in (2.31) gives the following Phillips curve,
￿t = (￿￿ qt + pht ￿ pt￿1) + ￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt): (2.33)
5 Since the central bank￿ s target level for output equals potential output, there will not be any average in￿ ation
bias in a discretion equilibrium.
11The ￿rst term on the right side involves variables that are either exogenous (￿ qt) or predetermined
( pht and pt￿1). The second term implies that the slope of the short-run Phillips curve is ￿.
The central bank will be able to control it by setting mt. For given in￿ ation expectations, this
will determine rt and yt. Via (2.33), ￿t is then determined. For simplicity, we can think of the
central bank as choosing yt directly, and then inferring the corresponding level of mt from (2.28).
We will see below that a liquidity trap can only arise in period 1, when expected productivity
growth and the natural interest rate are low. In all other periods, there is no liquidity trap. Then
(2.33) is the only relevant constraint. In those periods, the central bank￿ s optimization problem
under discretion is to minimize the period loss function (2.30) subject to the Phillips curve (2.33).
This implies the targeting rule (￿rst-order condition)
￿t ￿ ￿ = ￿
￿
￿
(yt ￿ ￿ yt): (2.34)
The only period in which new information is revealed is period 1. In all other periods t 6= 1, there
is no new information, and yt is known in the previous period, t ￿ 1. Equation (2.16) then implies
that output equals potential output, yt = ￿ yt, equation (2.32) implies that the real exchange rate
equals the natural real exchange rate rate, qt = ￿ qt, and the ￿rst-order condition (2.34) implies that
the in￿ ation rate equals the in￿ ation target. The real exchange rate is constant for t ￿ 2, implying
that the price of the home good and the nominal exchange rate increase at the same rate ￿. The
same argument applies for t ￿ 0, and we have the following result (st denotes the log exchange
rate):
Proposition 2.1. Under discretion, for t ￿ 0 and t ￿ 2, yt = ￿ yt, qt = ￿ qt, and pht ￿ ph;t￿1 = ￿t =
st ￿ st￿1 = ￿.
2.5. A liquidity trap in period 1
Having characterized the equilibrium in periods other than 1, we now focus on period 1. We can
summarize the model in period 1 as
y1 ￿ ￿ y = ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
(r1 ￿ ￿ r1) ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿2); (2.35)
￿1 ￿ ￿ = ￿(y1 ￿ ￿ y): (2.36)
Equation (2.35) is obtained by taking the log of (2.21) and (2.22) for t = 1 and observing that
perfect foresight applies from period 1 onwards. The inequality follows from the zero lower bound
12on the home nominal interest rate and the relation between the nominal and real interest rate in
period 1,
i1 = r1 + ￿2 ￿ 0: (2.37)
Equation (2.36) follows from (2.33), ￿ y1 = ￿ y, ￿￿ q1 + ph1 ￿ p0 = ￿(￿ q1 ￿ q0) + ￿ph1, q0 = ￿ q1 = ￿ q, and
the fact that ￿ph1 ￿ ph1 ￿ ph0 was set equal to ￿ in period 0 (because the drop in productivity
was unanticipated).
The economy is in a liquidity trap in period 1, if the constraint (2.37) prevents the central
bank from setting output at its potential level, that is, if ￿ r1 + ￿2 < 0. By Proposition 2.1, in a
discretion equilibrium, the in￿ ation rate will be set to ￿2 = ￿ in period 2. By (2.27), we then have
the following result.
Proposition 2.2. The economy falls in a liquidity trap in period 1 if and only if the natural
interest rate is su¢ ciently negative,
￿ r1 < ￿￿ ￿ 0;





In a discretion equilibrium with a liquidity trap in period 1, the best the central bank can do
is to set m1 ￿ ph1 + ￿, so the nominal interest rate will equal zero, i1 = 0. We let ^ denote the
values of variables in the discretion equilibrium, so ^ y1, ^ ￿1, and ^ r1 denote the corresponding values
of output, in￿ ation, and the real interest rate. From the binding constraints (2.35) and (2.37), it
follows that
^ y1 ￿ ￿ y =
1
1 ￿ ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿) < 0; (2.38)
^ ￿1 ￿ ￿ =
￿
1 ￿ ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿) < 0; (2.39)
^ r1 ￿ ￿ r1 = ￿(￿ r1 + ￿) > 0:
The output gap and the in￿ ation gap are negative, and the real interest-rate gap is positive.
2.6. The optimal policy under commitment
The above equilibrium is suboptimal, with a negative output gap that is unnecessary large, because
private-sector in￿ ation expectations are equal to the in￿ ation target. If possible, it would be better
13for the central bank to credibly commit to exceeding the in￿ ation target next period, period 2,
and this way create private-sector expectations in period 1 of a higher period-2 in￿ ation. This
would lower the real interest rate and reduce the magnitude of the output gap in period 1. In order
to specify this optimal policy￿ the optimal escape from a liquidity trap￿ we consider the optimal
policy in a liquidity trap under commitment.




￿(￿2 ￿ ￿)2 =
1
2
[(￿1 ￿ ￿)2 + ￿(y1 ￿ ￿ y)2 + ￿(￿2 ￿ ￿)2]: (2.40)
In period 2, we have y2 = ￿ y2 = ￿ y ￿ b, so there cannot be any surprise and liquidity trap in period
2. Hence, the period-2 output-gap term vanishes from (2.40). In addition, since there will not be
any surprise in period 2, there will not be any uncertainty about period-2 in￿ ation, ￿2, so actual
rather than expected in￿ ation appears in (2.40).
The central bank minimizes (2.40) subject to (2.35) and (2.36). We now consider ￿2 as a control




[(￿1 ￿ ￿)2 + ￿(y1 ￿ ￿ y)2 + ￿(￿2 ￿ ￿)2] ￿ ’1[
1
1 ￿ ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿2) ￿ y1 + ￿ y];
where ’1 ￿ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (2.35) and we will use (2.36) to substitute
for ￿1 ￿ ￿. The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to y1 and ￿2 and the complementary-slackness
condition are then, respectively,
￿(￿1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(y1 ￿ ￿ y) + ’1 = 0; (2.41)
￿(￿2 ￿ ￿) ￿
1
1 ￿ ￿




(￿ r1 + ￿2) ￿ y1 + ￿ y] = 0: (2.43)
In a liquidity trap, ’1 > 0. Eliminating ’1 from (2.41)￿ (2.43) results in the targeting rule under
commitment in a liquidity trap:6 Set m1 ￿ ph1 + ￿ and thereby i1 = 0, and choose ￿2 > ￿, and
thereby
y1 ￿ ￿ y =
1
1 ￿ ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿2); (2.44)
so as to ful￿ll the target criterion
￿2 ￿ ￿ = ￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(￿1 ￿ ￿) ￿
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(y1 ￿ ￿ y) > 0: (2.45)
6 Outside a liquidity trap, under commitment, the central bank would just set m1 and i1 such that y1 = ￿ y and
set ￿2 = ￿.
14The commitment equilibrium in the liquidity trap is then determined by (2.36), (2.44), and
(2.45). We let ~ denote the values of variables in the commitment equilibrium. Combining (2.36),
(2.44), and (2.45), we get
~ y1 ￿ ￿ y =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 + ￿2 + ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿) < 0; (2.46)
~ ￿2 ￿ ￿ = ￿
￿2 + ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 + ￿2 + ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿) > 0; (2.47)
~ r1 ￿ ￿ r1 = ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2
￿(1 ￿ ￿)2 + ￿2 + ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿) > 0;
where the last equation follows from (2.35) and (2.46).
Comparing the output gap in the commitment equilibrium, (2.46), with that in the discretion
equilibrium, (2.38), we see that
~ y1 ￿ ￿ y > ^ y1 ￿ ￿ y:
The magnitude of the negative output gap is less than under discretion. By (2.36), it follows that
the magnitude of the negative in￿ ation gap in period 1, ~ ￿1￿￿, is also smaller, ~ ￿1￿￿ > ^ ￿1￿￿. The
optimal policy trades o⁄ the right amount of period-2 overshoot of the in￿ ation target, ~ ￿2 ￿￿ > 0,
for the right amount of increase in the period-1 output and partial closing of the output gap. The
higher period-2 in￿ ation results in a smaller real-interest-rate gap, ~ r1 ￿ ￿ r1 < ^ r1 ￿ ￿ r1.
2.7. Implementing the commitment equilibrium
The commitment equilibrium will imply a period-2 money supply, ~ m2, given by
~ m2 = ~ p2h + g(￿ y ￿ b;r￿ + ￿) = ~ p2 ￿ ￿(￿ q ￿ b) + g(￿ y ￿ b;r￿ + ￿); (2.48)
where ~ p2h and ~ p2 ￿ p0+~ ￿1+~ ￿2 are the period-2 home-good and CPI price levels, respectively, and
we use that ~ p2h = ~ p2 ￿ ￿￿ q2, ￿ q2 = ￿ q ￿ b, y2 = ￿ y2 = ￿ y ￿ b, and i2 = r￿ + ￿.
The commitment equilibrium can be implemented, if the central bank can commit in period 1
to a period-2 money supply equal to ~ m2. Indeed, this would be the most direct way to implement
the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, and as noted by Krugman [12] and more recently by
Auerbach and Obstfeld [2], an expansion of the money supply that is perceived to be permanent
will be e⁄ective. However, as emphasized in Krugman [12] and Svensson [20], in the real world,
there is no direct mechanism through which central banks can commit to a particular future money
supply.
15Indeed, since the spring of 2001, the Bank of Japan has expanded the monetary base by more
than 60 percent. If this expansion had been perceived as permanent, it would have resulted in
dramatically increased expectations of future in￿ ation in Japan, which would have shown up in
either a large depreciation of the yen or a large rise in long interest rates. Obviously, none of this
has happened, and the obvious explanation is that the Bank of Japan is expected to contract the
monetary base in the future.
We will show below that we can ￿nd a di⁄erent commitment mechanism through which the
central bank can commit to a higher future price level, namely through a credible commitment
to a weaker currency. For this purpose, we will specify the exchange rates consistent with the
commitment and discretion equilibria. Using (2.17) and (2.32), the period-1 log exchange rate in
the commitment equilibrium is
~ s1 = ph1 + ~ q1 = ph1 + ￿ q + ~ y1 ￿ ￿ y; (2.49)
with ~ y1 ￿ ￿ y given by (2.46). The period-2 exchange rate can be derived from uncovered interest
parity, which follows from the log of (A.1) in appendix A and the fact that, under our assumptions,
there will be no surprise in period 2,
i1 = r￿ + s2 ￿ s1; (2.50)
which, since the nominal interest rate is equal to zero in the liquidity trap, implies
~ s2 = ~ s1 ￿ r￿: (2.51)
The central bank can implement the commitment equilibrium, if it can credibly commit itself
to pegging the exchange rate at the optimal levels ~ s1 and ~ s2 given by (2.49) and (2.51). That
is, the central bank would make a credible commitment to buy and sell unlimited amounts of
foreign exchange at those exchange rates. In a commitment equilibrium, it would then not have
to make any unlimited foreign-exchange interventions, but just the foreign-exchange interventions
that result in money supplies m1 ￿ ph1 + ￿ and m2 = ~ m2. The problem with such a commitment
is, however, that it will not be credible, if the central bank reoptimizes under discretion in period 2.
In order to see this, suppose that the central bank has credibly implemented the optimal policy
in period 1, resulting in the output gap ~ y1 ￿ ￿ y and the in￿ ation gap ~ ￿1 ￿ ￿ in period 1, as well as
expectations in period 1 of in￿ ation in period 2 equal to ~ ￿2. These expectations would then result
in period-1 pricing decisions resulting in the corresponding home-good price level ~ ph2. By (2.33),
16this implies that, in period 2, the central bank faces the Phillips curve
￿2 ￿ ~ ￿2 = ￿(y2 ￿ ￿ y2); (2.52)
where ex post in￿ ation ￿2 and output y2 could di⁄er from the levels expected in period 1, ~ ￿2 and
￿ y2. If the central bank reoptimizes under discretion in period 2, that is, minimizes the period loss
function (2.30) for t = 2, the corresponding ￿rst-order condition is
￿2 ￿ ￿ = ￿
￿
￿
(y2 ￿ ￿ y2): (2.53)







~ ￿2 < ~ ￿2:
That is, ex post, the central bank would renege on its commitment to implement the optimal
in￿ ation rate ~ ￿2 in period 2 and instead implement a lower in￿ ation rate. Anticipation of this
reneging by the private sector in period 1 would unravel the commitment equilibrium.
The above reneging cannot arise in the formulation of the Foolproof Way in Svensson [21].
There, monetary policy is concerned about domestic in￿ ation, in￿ ation in the home-currency price




[(pht ￿ ph;t￿1)2 + ￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt)2];
where domestic in￿ ation, pht￿ph;t￿1, enters rather than CPI in￿ ation, pt￿pt￿1. Since the period-t
domestic price level and domestic in￿ ation is predetermined by pricing decisions in period t￿1, the
central bank cannot renege. Indeed, the discussion of the price level in the context of the Foolproof
Way in Svensson [19]￿ [21] has consistently referred to the domestic price level rather than the
CPI price level. In the present set up, with monetary policy concerned about CPI in￿ ation and
instantaneous pass-through of exchange-rate movements to home-currency prices of the foreign
good, the period-t CPI price level and CPI in￿ ation are directly a⁄ected by the period-t exchange
rate, pt = (1 ￿ ￿)pht + ￿st, and reneging is possible.
Conditional on the assumption of reoptimization under discretion in period 2, the only equi-
librium in the present setup in period 1 is the discretion equilibrium, the equilibrium we have
characterized in section 2.5. The corresponding log exchange rates in the discretion equilibrium are
given by
^ s1 = ph1 + ^ q1 = ph1 + ￿ q + ^ y1 ￿ ￿ y < ~ s1;
^ s2 = ^ s1 ￿ r￿ < ~ s2:
17The exchange rates in the two periods are lower by the same amount￿ the currency is stronger￿
in the discretion equilibrium than in the commitment equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper, we argue that a commitment mechanism for a commitment to the opti-
mal exchange rates, (~ s1; ~ s2), can be found, provided that we add a simple and plausible assumption
to the model. This assumption is related to concerns that real-world central banks have with their
level of capital. The next section presents some evidence on these concerns.
3. The balance-sheet concerns of central banks
In the following sections, we extend our model by assuming that the central bank does not let its
capital fall below some threshold, and that this concern may override the macroeconomic objec-
tives for output and in￿ ation. This section presents some evidence supporting the realism of this
assumption.
At the outset, it should be noted that the central bank￿ s concern for its level of capital is not
obvious. Central banks do not need a positive level of capital for the same reasons as commercial
banks. A negative level of capital does not subject them to the risk of a run and a bankruptcy,
since they can always face their debt obligations by printing currency. So, strictly speaking, central
banks do not need capital (Stella [17]). If the central bank were consolidated with the central
government, there would be no reason to consider the central bank￿ s capital separately from the
intertemporal budget constraint of the government.
However, central banks have balance sheets that are constructed according to the same broad
principles as private banks.7 Central banks, furthermore, seem to be concerned by their capital as
their private counterparts. This is illustrated by several facts.
First, central-bank capital, although it can be quite low, is generally positive. In 2003, the
median level of central-bank capital (including reserves and provisions) represented 8.8 percent of
its total assets in emerging economies and 15.3 percent in advanced countries (Hawkins [10]). In
some countries, the central banks have had negative capital for prolonged periods of time, but these
are mostly Latin American countries with a history of monetary instability (Stella [18]).
Second, the level of capital seems closely related to the proportion of central-bank assets held
7 Each year, the central bank￿ s capital is increased or decreased by the amount of retained earnings or losses.
Retained earnings are equal to the pro￿t minus the dividend paid to the government and/or other shareholders.
Although the accounting rules di⁄er across central banks, the pro￿t may include valuation changes on most assets, in
particular, foreign-exchange reserves. When it does not, these valuation changes are included in a separate valuation
account on the liability side of the balance sheet, which can be viewed as a component of the bank￿ s capital broadly
de￿ned.
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as foreign-exchange reserves and thereby the amount of foreign-exchange risk they bear.8 Figure
3.1 plots the ratio of central-bank capital to total liabilities against the ratio of foreign-exchange
reserves to total assets, for a sample of OECD countries.9 The ￿gure illustrates the distinction
made by Sims [16] between two types of central banks. Some central banks (Sims￿ s type F) have a
low proportion of their assets as foreign-exchange reserves and have low capital ratios. One example
is the U.S. Federal Reserve System: it holds very little foreign-exchange reserves, and so does not
need a large amount of capital to bu⁄er the exchange risk. This category also includes countries
that have large total foreign-exchange reserves but in which most of these reserves are held by the
Treasury (Canada and Japan). The other type of central banks (Sims￿ s type E) have a higher
proportion of assets as foreign-exchange reserves, and accordingly maintain a higher capital ratio.
This category includes most European central banks.10
8 The other risky asset held by central banks is gold. However, gold is generally not risky from an accounting
point of view because of accounting rules that insulate the balance sheet from variations in its market price. Many
countries ignore changes in the market price of gold by utilizing a historical price set in foreign currency (frequently
the U.S. dollar or SDR). By contrast, foreign exchange reserves are generally valued at the market exchange rates.
9 The ￿gure reports averages over 1999￿ 2002, based on the annual reports of the central banks. Our measure of
capital includes reserves and revaluation accounts. Details are available from the authors upon request.
10 Central banks in the Eurosystem have a valuation account on the liabilities side of their balance sheets as
a reserve against valuation losses arising from changes in the exchange rate. This account re￿ ects net gains from
valuation changes that are not distributed but set aside as reserve against future losses from exchange rate changes.
When a valuation loss due to a change in the exchange rate occurs, the amount of the loss is deducted from the
balance of the valuation account. In case the balance of this account is insu¢ cient to cover the loss, it is included in
the pro￿t-and-loss account.
19Third, an increasing number of central banks explicitly de￿ne an objective in terms of a capital-
adequacy ratio. Since 1998, the Bank of Japan targets a capital-adequacy ratio, consisting of the
capital divided by a period average of outstanding bank notes, of around 8￿ 12 percent (Cargill [4],
Stella [18]). Recent legislation in Indonesia prevents the transfer of pro￿ts to the government until
the central bank builds its capital up to 10 percent of its monetary liabilities. The Reserve Bank
of India aims at capital and reserves of 8 percent of assets (Hawkins [10]).
The central banks￿revealed preferences suggest a strong aversion to negative or low capital.
But why is it so? The reasons given by central banks suggest that this has to do mainly with the
autonomy of their institutions relative to the government. As the governor of the Bank of Japan
put it in a recent speech (Fukui [8]),
[C]entral banks￿concern with the soundness of their capital base might not be grounded
purely in economic theory but may be motivated rather by the political economy in-
stincts of central bankers. In other words, once the restriction that ￿the central bank
should only take risks consistent with the level of its self-imposed capital base￿is vio-
lated, the boundary between the functions of the central bank and those of the govern-
ment may become di¢ cult to discern.
The relationship between central-bank independence and central-bank losses goes both ways.
First, a central bank that is not independent is more likely to make losses. These losses are
typically the result of accounting rules or of the transfer to the central bank of quasi-￿scal activities
(subsidized lending, bank bailouts) that make it possible for the government to arti￿cially reduce
the headline ￿scal de￿cit (Leone [13]).
Conversely, an independent central bank that makes large losses will see its independence eroded
over time. A loss-making central bank is likely to become the object of increased oversight from the
government￿ as any loss-making public entity should be. But the government might take advantage
of increased oversight to in￿ uence monetary policy (Vaez-Zadeh [15]; Ernhagen, Vesterlund and
Viotti [7]). As noted by Pringle [14, pp. 78 and 80]:
What would happen if the BoJ had to report huge paper losses? Public reaction would
be all important.... Also, the government might say that it would inject capital on
certain conditions￿ e.g., that the central bank changed its monetary policy.
4. How an independent central bank can commit to a future price level
Consider a central bank that ￿nds itself in a liquidity trap in period 1. The central bank cannot
commit to a particular money supply in the future. We will show that it can, nevertheless, move
20to and implement the commitment equilibrium in period 1 by managing its balance sheet in the
right way. Thereby it can commit itself to an exchange-rate in period 2 that corresponds to the
desired higher next-period in￿ ation, ~ ￿2.
De￿ne the central bank￿ s capital at the end of period t, Vt, as
Vt ￿ StRt ￿ Mt: (4.1)
We note that, by (2.6) and (4.1),
Vt = Ster￿
Rt￿1 ￿ Mt￿1 ￿ Zt; (4.2)
so the only non-predetermined variables in period t that the capital Vt depends on are the exchange
rate, St, and the dividend paid to the government during period t, Zt.
Importantly, let us assume that the central bank never allows its capital to fall below a given
nonnegative lower bound, ￿ V ,
Vt ￿ ￿ V ￿ 0. (4.3)
The rationale for this, as explained in section 3, is that too low a capital indicates mismanage-
ment, causes embarrassment, might require the resignation of the bank management, and, more
importantly, may force the central bank to ask for an injection of capital from the government, a
negative dividend, for which it may have to give up some of its independence. In line with this, we
also assume that the central bank has control over the dividend it pays and that this dividend is
always nonnegative,
Zt ￿ 0. (4.4)
Thus, we ￿nd (4.3) and (4.4) to be realistic assumptions. Assume, furthermore, that the private
sector believes that (4.3) and (4.4) always hold, that is, that the central bank will never voluntarily
allow its capital to fall below the minimum level or the dividend to be negative.
The central bank enters period 1 with given M0 and R0. Suppose that the economy initially is
in the discretion equilibrium in period 1, with the period-1 exchange rate equal to ^ S1, the expected
period-2 exchange rate equal to ^ S2, and with money supply, dividend, reserves and capital, denoted
^ M1; ^ Z1, ^ R1, and ^ V1, respectively, ful￿lling
^ M1 = ^ Z1 + ^ S1 ^ R1 + M0 ￿ ^ S1er￿
R0 ￿ Ph1e￿; (4.5)
^ V1 = ^ S1er￿
R0 ￿ M0 ￿ ^ Z1 ￿ ￿ V ￿ 0; (4.6)
21where we have used (2.6) and (4.2) and we recall that e￿ > 0 is the satiation level of real money.
We want to show that the central bank can implement the commitment equilibrium by depre-
ciating the currency in period 1 to the exchange rate ~ S1 > ^ S1 and committing to maintaining the
exchange rate ~ S2 > ^ S2 in period t + 1. This will then implement the optimal in￿ ation, ~ ￿2 > ￿, in
period 2 and the optimal overshooting of the in￿ ation target. The problem with this commitment,
as explained in section 2.7, is that the private sector knows that the central bank has an incentive
in period 2 to renege on its commitment and appreciate the currency below the exchange rate ~ S2,
so as to achieve an ex post in￿ ation rate closer to the in￿ ation target. How can the central bank
commit to not appreciating the currency in period 2? Our main result follows:
Proposition 4.1. The central bank can implement the commitment solution, ~ S1 and ~ S2, by peg-
ging its exchange rate to ~ S1 and by setting its capital equal to the minimum level in period 1,
V1 = ￿ V :
To see why this is true, we note that, in period 2, for given R1 and M1, (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4)
imply a lower bound for the period-2 exchange rate,
S2 ￿
M1 + ￿ V
er￿R1
: (4.7)
This inequality comes from the currency mismatch in the balance sheet of the central bank. The
central bank ￿nances foreign-currency assets by issuing home-currency liabilities. The central
bank￿ s capital remains above the threshold ￿ V only if the value of the its foreign-exchange reserves
is high enough in terms of home currency, that is, if the home currency is su¢ ciently depreciated.11
We then realize that the central bank should set and announce new levels of the money supply
and the foreign-exchange reserves in period 1, denoted ~ M1 and ~ R1, so that the central-bank capital
in period 2, evaluated at the desired exchange rate, ~ S2, for a zero dividend payment in period 2,
~ Z2 = 0, is exactly equal to the minimum level. Denote this level of the central bank￿ s capital by
~ V2. Then we have
~ V2 ￿ ~ S2er￿ ~ R1 ￿ ~ M1 = ￿ V : (4.8)
This implies that the lower bound for the period-2 exchange rate, the right side of (4.7) for period
2, is exactly equal to ~ S2. Furthermore, the central bank will never choose a higher exchange rate
11 Note the contrast with the currency mismatches that are the focus of the recent literature on international
￿nancial crises (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee [1]). There, domestic ￿rms are indebted in foreign currency so that
a depreciation reduces their net value.
22(weaker currency) in period 2 than this lower bound, because doing so would result in a CPI
in￿ ation rate even further away from the target and an even larger period-2 loss L2. Therefore, it
will then implement exactly the desired exchange rate ~ S2.
Using equations (4.1), (4.2), and the interest parity condition, ei1 = er￿
S2=S1, the central bank￿ s
capital in period 1 and period 2 are related as
V2 = V1 + (ei1 ￿ 1)S1R1 ￿ Z2:
The central bank￿ s capital increases by the revenues from seigniorage minus the dividend paid to
the government. If the economy is in a liquidity trap (i1 = 0), the revenues from seigniorage are
equal to zero. If the capital constraint is binding, furthermore, the central bank pays no dividend
in period 2, and we have
V2 = V1:
Hence, in order to set the value of its capital to the minimum level ￿ V in period 2, the central bank
must set this value at the minimum level in period 1. The end-of-period-1 capital evaluated at the
exchange rate ~ S1, denoted ~ V1, ful￿lls
~ V1 ￿ ~ S1er￿
R0 ￿ M0 ￿ ~ Z1 = ￿ V : (4.9)
Thus, in order to implement the commitment equilibrium, in period 1 the central bank should
pay the dividend ~ Z1 to the government so as to make its capital in period 1 equal ￿ V when evaluated
at the exchange rate ~ S1. Furthermore, it should adjust its money supply to exceed the satiation
level, ~ M1 > Ph1e￿, and thereby ensure that the period-1 nominal interest rate is zero. Finally, it
should make an explicit commitment to the peg of the exchange rate to ~ S1 and ~ S2, and, importantly,
publish its balance sheet. This allows the private sector to verify that the central bank￿ s capital in
period 1 equals its minimum value at the exchange rate ~ S1, which implies that the central bank￿ s
capital will equal the minimum value also in period 2 at the exchange rate ~ S2. Then the commitment
to the period-2 exchange rate will be credible, and ~ S1 will be the only exchange rate consistent
with those period-2 expectations and uncovered interest parity. The commitment equilibrium is
the only possible equilibrium.
It only remains to demonstrate that it is feasible for the central bank to choose a nonnegative
dividend ~ Z1 that sets its capital equal to the minimum level in period 1. This is the case, if its
capital is larger than the minimum level conditional on a zero dividend, that is
~ S1er￿
R0 ￿ M0 ￿ ￿ V :
23This is true by (4.6) and ~ S1 > ^ S1.12
If, counter to the above logic and announcements, the private sector, irrationally, would believe
that the currency might appreciate back to ^ S1 < ~ S1 in period 1, there will be excess demand for
currency and excess supply of foreign-exchange reserves. The central bank can, however, always
eliminate that excess demand and excess supply by issuing currency and buying foreign-exchange
reserves, that is, by increasing ~ R1 and ~ M1, by the interventions ￿R1 and ￿M1 ful￿lling ￿R1 =
￿M1=~ S1. This maintains the central bank￿ s capital at the level ~ V1 = ￿ V . Thus, we have shown
not only that the central bank has the incentive to maintain the exchange rate at ~ S1 and ~ S2 in
period 1 and 2 but that, in case there was nevertheless a speculative attack in the direction of
appreciating the currency (lowering the exchange rate) from ~ S1 in period 1, the central bank can
actually defend currency peg at that rate. The reason is that a speculative attack in the direction
of appreciating the currency can always be averted, since the resulting excess demand for home
currency can always be ful￿lled.13
5. Generalizations
We have shown how the central bank can commit to higher future in￿ ation by pegging the exchange
rate in a very simple model. The simplicity of the model is an advantage when explaining the logic
of the argument, but raises the question of the robustness of our results to realistic changes in the
assumptions.
5.1. A multiperiod liquidity trap
Would the balance-sheet channel still work if the liquidity trap lasted for several periods? A
multiperiod liquidity trap could arise in the model if nominal prices were sticky for more than
one period (Eggertsson and Woodford [6]). Let us simply assume, for the sake of this discussion,
that the liquidity trap would end in period ^ T > 2 under discretion, and that it is optimal to exit
the liquidity trap in period ~ T under commitment, where ~ T may di⁄er from ^ T. The commitment
12 The dividend payment, ~ Z1, will hence be positive. Since the government passes on the dividend to the private sec-
tor, the private sector receives a positive transfer. This transfer has, in itself, no e⁄ect on private-sector consumption
and demand in this model, since Ricardian equivalence holds and the private sector fully internalizes the government
and central-bank budget constraints (as in the derivation of consolidated home-country budget constraint, (2.9)).
13 This argument requires that the central bank stands ready to buy unlimited amounts of reserves. There is no
cost for the bank of doing so, since money is neutral in the liquidity trap. If instead the central bank allowed the
currency to appreciate when the level of reserves exceeds a certain level, there could be a speculative attack leading
to an appreciation of the domestic currency (Grilli [9]).
24equilibrium will be associated with an exchange rate path ~ S1, ~ S2, ..., ~ S ~ T, that satis￿es
~ St+1 = e￿r￿ ~ St for t = 1;:::; ~ T ￿ 1:
The home currency must, by uncovered interest parity, appreciate at the foreign-currency interest
rate, r￿, in each period, when the home-currency interest rate is zero.
As in the case of a one-period liquidity trap, the central bank can implement the commitment
equilibrium, if it can commit itself to the exchange-rate path ~ S1, ~ S2, ..., ~ S ~ T. It can do this, by
making sure that its capital in period ~ T, evaluated at the exchange rate ~ S ~ T and for a zero dividend
in period ~ T, Z ~ T = 0, equals the minimum level,
V ~ T = ￿ V :
The central bank can achieve this by setting its capital, evaluated at the exchange rate ~ S1, equal
to the minium level in period 1,
V1 = ￿ V :
Since the home nominal interest rate is zero in each period t = 1, ..., ~ T ￿1, this will, in equilibrium,
make the central bank￿ s capital equal to the minimum and the dividend equal to zero in each
period t = 2, ..., ~ T. One can show this by demonstrating that it is optimal for the central bank to
implement St = ~ St, Zt = 0 and Vt = ￿ V in each period t ￿ ~ T, if it has done so until period t ￿ 1.
This is a straightforward generalization of the proof for the two-period case. The constraints (4.2),
(4.3), and (4.4) imply
St ￿
Mt￿1 + ￿ V
er￿Rt￿1
:
By Vt￿1 = ~ St￿1Rt￿1 ￿ Mt￿1 = ￿ V and ~ St = e￿r￿ ~ St￿1, this inequality implies
St ￿ ~ St:
As in the one-period liquidity trap, this constraint will bind in equilibrium. The central bank will
minimizes its period loss by setting St = ~ St; Zt = 0 and Vt = ￿ V :
5.2. Generalizing the capital constraint
Constraint (4.3), with a constant minimum capital level, is a simple but particular way of modeling
the central bank￿ s balance-sheet concerns. First, it would be natural to assume that the minimum
level of capital ￿ V increases over time, at least in the long run. For example, if the objective of the
25central bank were to preserve the real value of its capital, the lower bound could be indexed on
average in￿ ation
￿ Vt = ￿ V0e￿t ￿ ￿ V0
for t ￿ 0 (since ￿ ￿ 0).
Assume that the minimum capital is strictly increasing over time. For the one-period liquidity
trap, it is easy to show that Proposition 4.1 still holds, except that the central bank now sets its
period-1 capital to the period-2 minimum level,
V1 = ￿ V2 > ￿ V1;
so the capital will exceed the minimum level in period 1.
Similarly, for a multi-period liquidity trap with optimal exit in period ~ T > 2, the commitment to
the exchange-rate level ~ S ~ T is achieved by setting the capital in period 1, evaluated at the exchange
rate ~ S1, equal to the minimum level in period ~ T,
V1 = ￿ V ~ T:
For zero dividend payments, this will keep the capital constant and equal to that minimum level
for all periods 2, ..., ~ T, although the capital will exceed the minimum level in period 1, ..., ~ T ￿ 1,
Vt = V1 > ￿ Vt (1 ￿ t ￿ ~ T ￿ 1):
The central bank might be tempted to increase its capital before period ~ T, so as to renege on the
commitment to ~ ST, but it cannot do so with a nonnegative dividend. Since its capital exceeds the
minimum capital before period ~ T, it could reduce its capital below ￿ V ~ T, but this would force it to
implement an even weaker currency in period ~ T (a higher exchange rate than ~ S ~ T), which would
increase its loss and not be optimal.
Second, some capital-adequacy rules may be problematic in a liquidity trap. For example,
assume that the capital adequacy ratio is de￿ned as a fraction of the supply of home currency,
￿ Vt = ￿Mt (5.1)
with ￿ > 0 given (as in Japan). In a liquidity trap, the level of Mt is undetermined, as long as
it exceeds the satiation level of demand for home currency. Typically, the monetary base during
the liquidity trap may be much higher than the equilibrium monetary base when the liquidity trap
is over (cf. the above comments on the large expansion of the monetary base in Japan, which the
26private sector apparently expects to a large extent to be undone when Japan exits from the liquidity
trap). But this means, under (5.1), that the minimum capital level will be much higher during the
liquidity trap. This will prevent the central bank from reducing its capital to the minimum capital
level in the period of exit from the liquidity trap. From the point of view of escaping a liquidity
trap, it is preferable to de￿ne the minimum capital level as a given exogenous level rather than as
a fraction of an endogenous monetary aggregate.
Finally, it might be realistic to assume more ￿ exibility in the balance-sheet concerns of the
central bank. The capital-adequacy objective could, for instance, be de￿ned as an average over a
number of periods. There could also be more symmetry between the balance-sheet objectives and
the monetary-policy objectives of the central bank. For example, the central bank￿ s balance-sheet
concerns could be modeled as an additional term in its objective function instead of a constraint
on its optimization problem. The period loss function (2.30) could be augmented with a term




[(￿t ￿ ￿)2 + ￿(yt ￿ ￿ yt)2 + ￿(vt ￿ ￿ v)2]; (5.2)
where ￿ > 0 is the weight on the balance-sheet concerns, vt is the log of Vt and ￿ v is the log of a
target level of capital. The model would be the same as before as long as the central bank, without
being restricted with regard to the monetary-policy objectives, can choose the level of dividends
such that the level of capital is equal to the target level, vt = ￿ v. However, when the nonnegativity
constraint on the dividend is binding, that is, when vt < ￿ v, there may be a tradeo⁄ between
the macroeconomic objectives and the balance-sheet concerns of the central bank. Other things
equal, by increasing the dividend in a liquidity trap in period t and reducing vt+1 at an unchanged
exchange rate in period t+1, the central bank can create incentives under discretion to depreciate
its currency in period t+1. This way, the central bank can generate in￿ ation expectations in period
t so as to reduce the real interest rate in period t and improve the equilibrium under discretion.
Central-bank capital hence still provides a predetermined state variable that the central bank can
use to create a commitment mechanism.
5.3. Pegging the price of other assets than foreign exchange
As noted in section 3, in some countries (including Japan), the central bank holds only a small
amount of foreign-exchange reserves. Most of the foreign-exchange reserves are held, and the
associated risk is born, by the Treasury. This does not necessarily prevent these central banks to
27optimally escape a liquidity trap with an exchange rate peg since￿ as shown in appendix D￿ the
results of section 4 remain true even if the central holds small foreign-exchange reserves, as long as
they are positive. This is because when the capital constraint is binding, the minimum level that
it implies for the exchange rate does not depend on the amount of foreign-exchange reserves. In
principle, therefore, the commitment mechanism presented in this paper could work with a very
small amount of foreign-exchange reserves.
The amount of foreign-exchange reserves is irrelevant because the balance-sheet concerns of the
central banker are modeled as the constraint (4.3). If instead these concerns were modeled with
the loss function (5.2), then the amount of foreign-exchange reserves would matter, since it would
determine the sensitivity of the central bank￿ s capital to the exchange rate. In this case, the central
bank might have to increase its foreign-exchange reserves drastically in order to tie its hands using
the foolproof way. Alternatively, the desired commitment might be achieved by pegging the price
of assets other than foreign-exchange reserves. What other assets could be used for this purpose?
We show in this section that the balance-sheet management can be generalized to some, but
not all assets. The important distinction in this regard is between the assets whose returns are
predetermined in home currency (￿nominal￿assets, such as home-currency bonds of all maturities)
and assets whose returns are not predetermined (￿real￿assets, such as stocks, real estate or indexed
bonds). The latter, and the not the former, provide the appropriate tool for the sort of commitment
strategies we have analyzed so far.
Consider the case of an in￿ ation-indexed consol that yields a positive nominal coupon payment
of ￿Pt in each period t, where ￿ > 0 (the result can be generalized to other assets such as stocks,
but it is easiest to show it with an indexed consol). Let Pc
t denote the home-currency price of the
consol in period t (after the payment of the interest in period t). In equilibrium, investing in the







From the fact that, from period t = 2 onwards, Pt and Pc
t increase at the rate ￿ and it = r￿ + ￿;





Pt (t ￿ 2): (5.4)





28The commitment solution can then be implemented by pegging the price of the consol to the
levels in period 1 and 2, ~ Pc
1 and ~ Pc












where ~ P2 is the period-2 CPI in the commitment equilibrium.
Assume that consols are the only assets on the central bank￿ s balance sheet, and let Xt denote
the number of consols held by the central bank between period t and period t+1. Then the central
bank￿ s budget constraint is
Zt + Pc
t Xt = Mt ￿ Mt￿1 + (Pc
t + ￿Pt)Xt￿1; (5.6)
and its capital is given by
Vt = Pc
t Xt ￿ Mt (5.7)
= (Pc
t + ￿Pt)Xt￿1 ￿ Mt￿1 ￿ Zt: (5.8)
In particular, the period-2 level of capital is given by
V2 = er￿
Pc
2X1 ￿ M1 ￿ Z2;
where we have used (5.4) for t = 2 to replace Pc
2 + ￿P2. The capital constraint V2 ￿ ￿ V and the
dividend constraint Z2 ￿ 0 then imply
Pc
2 ￿
M1 + ￿ V
er￿X1
;
in analogy with (4.7). This sets a lower bound on the price of consols in period 2￿ and, because
of (5.4), also on the period-2 CPI. In period 1, the central bank should then choose M1 and X1 at
levels ~ M1 and ~ X1 such that the lower bound equals the commitment level ~ Pc
2, that is,




By (5.5) and (5.7), this implies
~ V1 = ￿ V .
This is the same condition as in Proposition 4.1. It is easy to check, that this level ~ V1 can be achieved
with a positive level of the period-1 dividend, ~ Z1 ￿ 0, if the capital and dividend constraints are
29satis￿ed in the discretion equilibrium. Thus, the commitment possibilities are essentially the same
as in Proposition 4.1. The central bank can implement the commitment equilibrium and the CPI
levels ~ P1 and ~ P2 by pegging the period-1 price of real consols to ~ Pc
1 and setting its period-1 capital
to ~ V1 = ￿ V .
Interestingly, it is crucial for the argument that the bond￿ s coupon payment is ￿xed in real
terms. Assume instead that ￿ denotes a ￿xed coupon payment in home currency. Then equation





(t ￿ 2): (5.9)
It follows that the home-currency price of the bond in period 2 is una⁄ected by monetary policy.
Thus, it is impossible for the central bank to peg the nominal price of the bond in period 2 to a
level di⁄erent from the right side of (5.9). The commitment solution can no longer be implemented
by pegging Pc
2 to ~ Pc
2.
It is straightforward to see that this result would hold for any asset with returns predetermined
in home currency. The price of the asset is equal to the future nominal cash ￿ ows discounted by the
nominal interest rate i = r+￿￿. Balance-sheet management works with foreign-exchange reserves or
indexed bonds because, since the future equilibrium is homogenous of degree one in home-currency
units, pegging the home-currency price of these assets is equivalent to pegging the home-currency
price level, the home-currency value of the CPI. This does not work with ￿xed-income securities
denominated in home currency.
6. Conclusions
As we have emphasized above, in a liquidity trap, the nominal interest rate is zero, but the real
interest rate is higher than optimal. This causes a recession that is deeper than optimal. The
higher-than-optimal real interest rate is due to private-sector expectations of low in￿ ation or even
de￿ ation. The optimal policy in this situation must generate expectations of a higher future price
level and thereby expectations of higher future in￿ ation. This will lower the real interest rate and
stimulate the economy out of the liquidity trap even though the nominal interest rate is zero. The
bene￿t of this is worth overshooting the future in￿ ation or price-level target. The problem is how
to make the higher future price level credible. A promise of a higher future price level may not be
credible, since the central bank may renege on its promise in the future and achieve a lower price
level than promised, so as to maintain low and stable in￿ ation.
30This paper shows that a central bank￿ s realistic concerns about its balance sheet and capital
allows it to commit to a higher future price level through a currency depreciation and a crawling
peg, in line with Svensson￿ s [19] and [20] Foolproof Way to escape from a liquidity trap. The
bank wishes to maintain its independence from the government. A negative capital would require a
capital injection and put the bank at the government￿ s mercy. In order to avoid this, the bank never
voluntarily allows its capital to fall below a certain minimum level. Because undoing the current
currency depreciation by a future currency appreciation would imply a future capital loss on the
bank￿ s foreign-exchange reserves, a minimum capital level provides a lower bound on the future
exchange rate (an upper bound on the future currency appreciation). By managing its capital such
that the minimum capital level is reached for the exchange-rate level consistent with the desired
higher future price level, the bank can commit itself to the appropriate exchange-rate path and
thereby to the appropriate higher future price level. This kind of commitment mechanism is also
possible, if the central bank￿holds other assets then foreign-exchange reserves, but not if it holds
only ￿xed-income securities nominated in home currency.
To conclude on a more general note, this paper might contribute to draw the attention of scholars
to the balance sheet concerns of central bankers and their implications for monetary policy. These
concerns have not been analyzed in the academic literature, although central bankers do seem to
care about their balance sheets in the real world. This omission may not be a serious one when
central bankers￿balance sheet concerns do not signi￿cantly in￿ uence monetary policy and can be
safely ignored to a ￿rst approximation. However, there are situations￿ and a liquidity trap is an
important example￿ where central bankers￿balance sheet concerns might matter in a nontrivial
way for monetary policy-making. This observation would seem to warrant more theoretical and
empirical research on the foundations of central bankers￿ balance sheet concerns and on their
implication for monetary policy.
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A. First-order conditions
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implying (2.10); and for home-currency bonds,
￿t = ￿eitEt￿t+1;
implying (using the ￿rst-order condition for foreign-currency bonds and ￿er￿
= 1)













which by the assumptions on the liquidity-services function and (2.8) can be written in reduced
form as (2.24).
32B. Derivation of equation (2.12)






























































We realize that all ￿rms ￿ 2 [0;1] will set the same price Ph;t+1(￿) and produce the same quantity
Yt+1(￿), so by (2.2) and (2.3) we have Ph;t+1(￿) = Ph;t+1 and Yt+1(￿) = Yt+1 for all ￿ 2 [0;1]. Using
this, (2.8) and the fact that Ph;t+1 will be predetermined and known in period t, the price-setting
equation can be written as (2.12).
C. Households and ￿rms perceiving a positive probability of a liquidity trap
Assume that private agents correctly perceive that the fall in log productivity, b, or equivalently the
period 1 natural real interest rate ￿ r1, will be drawn from a probability distribution. For convenience
we de￿ne the probability distribution in terms of ￿ r1 rather than b, and denote its density function
by f(￿ r1). Private agents know f(￿ r1) and form their expectations rationally.
Until period 0 and from period 2 onwards, the economy is in the steady states that we have
already analyzed in the text. In period 1, the Phillips curve (2.36) can be written
￿1 = (￿￿ q ￿ q0) + ￿ph1 + ￿(y1 ￿ ￿ y);
where ￿ph1 ￿ ph1 ￿ ph0 and we use that p0 = ￿q0 + ph0. Since q0 = ￿ q, this becomes
￿1 ￿ ￿ph1 = ￿(y1 ￿ ￿ y); (C.1)
For period 0, we can no longer assume that intermediate-good producers preset prices for period 1
such that ￿ph1 = ￿. These producers realize that the economy might with some probability be
33in a liquidity trap in period 1, in which case the realized in￿ ation rate will be lower than ￿. As
a consequence, ￿ph1 will not equal ￿ but be lower than ￿. It will be the solution to a ￿xed-point
problem that we specify below.
Price setters do not know for sure, in period 0, whether the economy will be in a liquidity trap
in period 1. The economy will be in a liquidity trap in period 1 if the fall in expected productivity
growth, b, is above a threshold, or, equivalently, if the natural interest rates, ￿ r1; falls below a
threshold (both thresholds are endogenously determined in equilibrium). If the economy is in a
liquidity trap, the output gap is given by the binding constraint (2.35) with ￿2 = ￿
y1 ￿ ￿ y =
1
1 ￿ ￿
(￿ r1 + ￿):
If the economy is not in a liquidity trap, the output gap can be computed by eliminating ￿1 from
(C.1) and (2.34). This gives
y1 ￿ ￿ y =
￿
￿ + ￿2(￿ ￿ ￿ph1):
The equilibrium output gap is the minimum of these two expressions




(￿ r1 + ￿);
￿
￿ + ￿2(￿ ￿ ￿ph1)
￿
: (C.2)
Equation (2.16) for t = 1 can be written in logs as
E0 exp(y1 ￿ ￿ y) = 1;








(￿ r1 + ￿);
￿
￿ + ￿2(￿ ￿ ￿ph1)
￿￿
f(￿ r1)d￿ r1 = 1: (C.3)
The equilibrium level of ￿ph1 is the solution to this equation. In equilibrium, the economy falls
into the liquidity trap if and only if the natural rate of interest rate falls below the level, denoted
r, for which the two terms under the minimum are equal. This level is given by
r = ￿￿ +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ + ￿2 (￿ ￿ ￿ph1):
Note that r > ￿￿ for ￿ph1 < ￿, so the fact that the liquidity trap is expected with some prob-
ability makes the liquidity trap happen more often. The threshold r for the natural interest rate
corresponds to a threshold for b.
Note that equation (C.3) does not necessarily have a solution. In particular, a solution exists
only if the probability of a liquidity trap is not too large.
34To see this, assume that private agents know with certainty that the natural real interest rate
will fall to a level ￿ r1 < ￿￿. Then the minimum term on the left side of (C.3) is always strictly
negative, implying that the integral cannot be equal to 1. There is no equilibrium in this case.
To take a more speci￿c example that nests the assumption made in the main text, assume that
expected fall in productivity growth, b, is binomially distributed, with a positive value resulting in
￿ r1 < ￿￿ with probability ￿ and a zero value resulting in ￿ r1 = r￿ with probability 1 ￿ ￿. Then it
is not di¢ cult to see that equation (C.3) has a solution￿ and an equilibrium exists￿ if and only if
the probability of an expected fall in productivity growth, ￿; is not too large. In the main text, we
considered the limit case where this probability is in￿nitesimally small. In this case the solution is
￿ph1 = ￿.14
Conditional on these changes, the analysis presented in the main text remains essentially the
same. The period-1 relationships remain (2.35) and (2.36), with ￿ in (2.36) replaced by the level
of ￿ph1 that satis￿es (C.3). This complicates the algebra somewhat, but the discretion and com-
mitment equilibria, as well as the impact of the central banker￿ s balance-sheet concerns, can be
derived following the same steps as in sections 2.5, 2.6, and 4.
D. Central-bank assets including domestic credit
With domestic credit, Dt ￿ 0, on the central bank￿ s balance sheet, we have to modify the domestic
bond market equilibrium, (2.7), to be
Bt + Dt = 0;
(in which case the central bank holds privately issued bonds), or modify the government￿ s budget
constraint to include bonds issued, interest on outstanding bounds, net transfers to the private
sector, and the dividend received from the central bank. The central bank￿ s balance sheet, (2.6),
is modi￿ed to
Zt + StRt + Dt = Mt ￿ Mt￿1 + Ster￿
Rt￿1 + eit￿1Dt￿1; (D.1)
and the central bank￿ s capital is given by
Vt ￿ StRt + Dt ￿ Mt ￿ ￿ V ￿ 0; (D.2)
14 The nonexistence of equilibrium with a su¢ ciently high probability of a liquidity trap is related to the observation
that monetary policy that keeps in￿ ation expectations low may prevent an equilibrium also under ￿ exible prices. As
noted in footnote 4, the assumption of constant money supply is su¢ cient to ensure that no liquidity trap arises
under ￿ exible prices. With a constant future money supply, the future price level is exogenous. With ￿ exible prices,
a present negative output gap and hence a positive real interest-rate gap cause the present price level to fall. This
increases expected in￿ ation, reduces the interest-rate gap and increases the output gap. The present price level falls
until the output and interest-rate gaps are zero. It follows that monetary policy that prevents in￿ ation expectations
from rising may prevent a ￿ ex-price equilibrium with a low natural interest rate.
35which, using the ￿rst equation, can be rewritten:
Vt = Ster￿
Rt￿1 + eit￿1Dt￿1 ￿ Mt￿1 ￿ Zt ￿ ￿ V ￿ 0:
It follows that, if the central bank does not distribute any dividend in period 2 and the economy
was in a liquidity trap in period 1 (i1 = 0), the period-2 exchange rate satis￿es
S2 ￿
M1 ￿ D1 + ￿ V
er￿R1
; (D.3)
which generalizes (4.7). The lower bound on the right-hand-side must be equal to ~ S2, which is the
case if the period-2 level of central bank capital ~ V2 = ~ S2er￿
R1 + D1 ￿ M1 is equal to ￿ V . So it
remains true that the central bank must set its capital at the minimum level ￿ V to implement the
commitment exchange rate in period 2. To see the implication for the period 1 dividend policy,
using (D.1) and (D.2), we note that
V2 = V1 + (ei1 ￿ 1)(S1R1 + D1) ￿ Z2;
which, together with i1 = 0 and Z2 = 0, implies that V1 must be equal to ￿ V , too. As in the
case with no domestic credit, we can then demonstrate that it is possible to choose a non-negative
dividend Z1 in period 1 so as to set V1 equal to ￿ V by using the assumption that the central bank￿ s
capital is above the minimum under discretion (^ V1 ￿ ￿ V ). The levels of R1 and D1 are not unique
in the optimal policy. However, there must be a strictly positive level of reserves, otherwise the
constraint V1 ￿ ￿ V would not involve the exchange rate (we cannot write equation (D.3) if R1 = 0).
It follows that the presence of domestic credit does not a⁄ect the commitment mechanism as long
as there is a strictly positive level of reserves.
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